tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-91734071658444898792024-03-05T14:02:41.669+09:00Yukihiko Funaki Pagehttp://yfunaki.blogspot.com/http://www.blogger.com/profile/14163810960774814453noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9173407165844489879.post-65651797711421975692016-05-27T09:34:00.014+09:002023-01-29T09:42:24.103+09:00<span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;"><a href="http://yukihikofunaki.blogspot.jp/">Japanese page is here.</a></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;"><b>Refereed articles:</b></span></div><div style="font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;"><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[53] </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">René van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, <u>Yukihiko Funaki</u>, Zhengxing Zou, "</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable Contributions," </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;"><i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>, Volume 307, Issue 2, Pages 975-983, 2023. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #007398; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; text-decoration-line: underline;">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.</span><wbr style="background-color: white; color: #007398; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"></wbr><span style="background-color: white; color: #007398; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; text-decoration-line: underline;">ejor.2022.10.017</span></div></span></div>
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<div><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;"><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">[52] Ai Takeuchi, Robert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo, <u>Yukihiko Funaki</u>, "Bargaining over a Jointly Produced Pie: The Effect of The Production Funation on Bargaining Outcomes," <i>Games and Economic Behaviors</i>, 134, pp169-198, 2022.</span></div><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">[51] </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Zhengxing Zou, René van den Brink, </span><u style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Yukihiko Funaki</u><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">, </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">"Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values," <i>Theory and Decision</i>, 98, 185-217, 2022.</span></div><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">[50] </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Takaaki Abe, </span><u style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Yukihiko Funaki</u><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">, Taro Shinoda, "I</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">nvitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation," <i>Games</i>, 12(3), 64, 2021; open access https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064</span></div><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo;"><span style="font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;"><span style="color: #222222;">[49] Zhengxing Zou, René van den Brink, </span><u style="color: #222222;">Yukihiko Funaki,</u><span style="color: #222222;">"Compromising between the Proportional and Equal Division Values," </span><i style="color: #222222;">Journal of Mathematical Economics</i><span style="color: #222222;">, 97 , 2021</span><u>. </u></span><a aria-label="Persistent link using digital object identifier" class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102539" rel="noreferrer noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: NexusSans, Arial, Helvetica, "Lucida Sans Unicode", "Microsoft Sans Serif", "Segoe UI Symbol", STIXGeneral, "Cambria Math", "Arial Unicode MS", sans-serif; font-size: 14px; margin: 0px; outline-width: 0px; padding: 0px; word-break: break-word;" target="_blank" title="Persistent link using digital object identifier"><span style="color: black;">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102539</span></a></div></span></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; margin: 0mm 0mm 0.0001pt;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">[48] Takaaki Abe, <u>Yukihiko Funaki</u>,“The unbinding core for coalitional form games,” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Volume 113, pp. 39-42, September 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; margin: 0mm 0mm 0.0001pt;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[47] Takaaki Abe,<u>Yukihiko Funaki</u>, "The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities ," <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> 50, pp.167-183, 2021 [doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00745-x]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; margin: 0mm 0mm 0.0001pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[46] Zhengxing Zou, Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, </span><u style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Yukihiko Funak</u><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">i, “Axiomatizations of the proportional division value,” </span><i style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Social Choice and Welfare</i><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;"><i>, 57, pp.35-62, 2021,</i></span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;"> open access https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01299-3</span></p><div><div><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[45] Adrian Penalver, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama, <u>Yukihiko Funaki</u> and Ryuichiro Ishikawa, "A quantitative easing experiment," <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i>, Volume 119, October 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103978 </span></div><div><span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">[44] Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo and </span><u style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Yukihiko Funaki</u><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">, "Redistribution to the less productive: Parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," </span><i style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Theory and Decision, </i></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;">91, pp.81–98,</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, times new roman, serif;"> 2021. open access https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09781-1 </span></div><div><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[43] Peter Borm,<u> Yukihiko Funaki</u>, Yuan Ju, "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," <i>Homo Oeconomicus</i>, Volume 37, pp. 67-85, May 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00097-7 </span></div><div><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[42] Takaaki Abe and<u> Yukihiko Funaki</u>, "The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities," <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i>, Volume 50, pp. 167-183, October 2020.</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00745-x </span></div></div><div style="font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span>[41]</span><span style="color: #222222; font-size: 15.4px;"> Toru Hokari, </span><u style="color: #222222; font-size: 15.4px;">Yukihiko Funaki</u><span style="color: #222222; font-size: 15.4px;"> and Peter Sudholter,"Consistency, Anonymity, and the Core on Domain of Convex Games," to appear in </span><i style="color: #222222; font-size: 15.4px;">Review of Economic Design</i><span style="color: #222222; font-size: 15.4px;">, 2020.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">,</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: times;"><span style="font-style: normal;">[40]</span><span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-style: normal;"> Yasushi Asako, Y<u>ukihiko Funaki</u>, Kozo Ueda and Nobuyuki Uto, "(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," to appear in </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;"><i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i>, 2019.</span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: times;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span><span style="background-color: white;">[39] </span></span><u>Yukihiko Funaki</u><span>, Harold Houba and Evgenia Motchenkova, "</span></span><span style="color: #222222;">Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with </span><span style="color: #222222;">non-expandable infrastructures," to appear in <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i>, 2019.</span></span></div>
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<span class="il" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: times;">[38] Junnosuke Shino, Yukihiko Funaki and Nobuyuki Uto, "Vulnerability of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations to overbidding: An experimental approach," to appear in <i>Global Finance Journal </i>, 2019.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: times;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-style: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;">[37] </span><span style="color: #222222;"><span>Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote and </span><u>Yukihiko Funaki</u><span>, "Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games," to appear in </span><i><span>Social Choice and </span><span>Welfare</span></i><span>, 2019.[36]</span></span> R. Takahashi, Y. Todo and Yukihiko Funaki, "How can we motivate consumers to purchase certified forest coffee? Evidence from a laboratory randomized experiment using eye-trackers," <i>Ecological Economics</i>, Volume 150, pp. 107-121, August 2018. </span><div><span style="font-family: times;">[35] Robert Veszteg and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monetary payoffs and utility in laboratory experiments," <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, Volume 65, pp. 108-121, April 2018.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[34] Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Robert Veszteg ”Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule," <i>Games</i>, 2017, 8(4), 52; doi:10.3390/g8040052</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[33] Yokote Koji, Takumi Kongo and Yukihiko Funaki, "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors,"<i> Games and Economic Behavior</i>, Volume 108, pp. 113-124, March 2018.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[32] Yokote Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “Coincidence of the Shapley Value with Other Solutions Satisfying Covariance,” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences,</i> Volume 89, pp.1-9, September 2017.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[31] Yokote Koji and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games," <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp.171–203, June 2017.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[30] Yokote Koji, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki, "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," <i>Mathematical Methods of Operations Research</i>, Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, June 2017. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[29] Takaaki Abe, and Yukihiko Funaki, “The Non-emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game”, <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i>, 46, pp.715-736, 2017. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">[28] Takumi Kongo,</span><u style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Yukihiko Funaki</u><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">,"Marginal Games and Characterizations of the Shapley Value in TU Games, " </span><i style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;">Game Theory and Applications,</i><span style="color: #222222; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", serif;"> Communications in Computer and Information Science Book Series 758, pp.165-163, Springer, Singapore, 2017.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[27] Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki and Boram Park, “Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-games,” Theory and Decision, Volume 81, Issue 3, pp 427–447,September 2016.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[26] Yokote Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “A New Basis and the Shapley Value,” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>. Vol.80, pp.21-24, 2016.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[25] Takayuki Oishi, Mikio Nakayama, Toru Hokari and Yukihiko Funaki, “Duality and Anti-duality in TU Games Applied to Solutions, Axioms, and Axiomatizations,” <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>.Volume 63, Pages 44–53, March 2016, </span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[24] Jiang, Ting, Jan Potters and Yukihiko Funaki, “Eye-tracking Social Preferences.” <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making</i>, Vol.29, Issue2-3, pp.157-168, 2016.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[23] Rene van den Brink and Yukihiko Funaki, "Implementation and Axiomatization of Discounted Shapley Values", <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 329-344, 2015.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[22] Robert Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki and Aiji Tanaka: “The impact of the Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami on social capital in Japan: Trust before and after the disaster,” I<i>nternational Political Science Review</i>, published online before, doi: 10.1177/0192512113509501 , April 2, 2014.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: times;">[21] Y. Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki, “Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> Vol. 84, pp. 180–195, 2014.</span></div></div></div><div style="background-color: #fff9ee; color: #222222; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">[20] Yukihiko Funaki and Takehiko Yamato "Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes," <i>International Game Theory Review</i> Vol.16, Issue 3, 2014.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;">[19] <span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;">Fukuda, E., Y. Kamijo, A. Takeuchi, M. Masui, and Y. Funaki: Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of the keyword auction mechanisms, <i>Rand Journal of Economics</i> vol. 44, Issue3, pp.438-461, 2013.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;">[18] van den Brink, Rene. Yukihiko Funaki and Gerard van del Laan, "Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties," <i>European Journal of Operational Research</i> 228, pp.413-417, 2013.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[17] Rene van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki and Yuan Ju, "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values" </span><i style="font-family: times;">Social Choice and Welfare</i><span style="font-family: "times";"> Volume 40, Issue 3, pp.693-714, 2013.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[16] Grabisch, M. and Y. Funaki, "A Coalition Formation Value for Games in Partition Function Form,"<i> European Journal of Operational Research</i> 221, pp.175-185, 2012.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[15] Vyrastekova, J., Y. Funaki and A. Takeuchi, "Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment," </span><i style="font-family: times;">Journal of Socio-Economics</i><span style="font-family: "times";">, 40, pp.919-928, 2011.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[14] Kongo, T., Y. Funaki, R. Branzei and S. Tijs, "Non-cooperative and Axiomatic Characterizations of the Average Lexicographic Value," <a href="http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198910002751?prevSearch=Non-cooperative+and+Axiomatic+Characterizations+of+the+Average+Lexicographic+Value%2C&searchHistoryKey=" style="color: #888888; text-decoration: none;"><i>International Game Theory Review</i> 12, pp.417-435, 2010.</a></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[13] Funaki Y. and R. van den Brink, "Axiomatization of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games,"<i> Theory and Decision</i> 67, pp.303-340, 2009.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[12] </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Y.Funaki and T.Yamato, </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core in terms of Consistency," </span><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/wj0w75303kw3n348/" style="color: #888888;"><i>Advances in Dynamic Games Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, 2006.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[11] </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">H.Aarts, Y.Funaki, C. Hoede.</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"Set games," </span><a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=ja&lr=&id=jmSVTkag4ZQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&dq=%22Holler%22+%22Power+Indices+and+Coalition+Formation%22+&ots=nG_zXs5jzu&sig=8trfiUra3Lrl2P8qZ0gphbCzs5k" style="color: #888888;"><i>Power Indices and Coalition Formation,</i> edited by M.J.Holler and G.Owen</a>, <a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=ja&lr=&id=jmSVTkag4ZQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&dq=%22Holler%22+%22Power+Indices+and+Coalition+Formation%22+&ots=nG_zXs5jzu&sig=8trfiUra3Lrl2P8qZ0gphbCzs5k" style="color: #888888;">Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands</a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, 2001.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: #fff9ee; color: #222222; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[10] Y.</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Funaki and T.Yamato,</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization," </span><a href="http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?id=pii:S0219198901000361&type=html" style="color: #888888;"><i>International Game Theory Review</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;"> 3, pp.175-187, 2001.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;">[9] <span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Y.Funaki and T.Yamato,</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"The Core of an Economy with Common Pool Resource: A Partition Function Form Approach," </span><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/cgxb8k7ayqyet6f0/" style="color: #888888;"><i>International Journal Game Theory</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, Vol.28, pp.157-171, 1999.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[8] </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">H.Aarts, Y. Funaki and C.Hoede,</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;"> "A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games," </span><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/w475313422862680/" style="color: #888888;"><i>International Journal of Game Theory</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, Vol.26, pp 97-111 1997.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[7] Y.</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Funaki and T.Driessen, "</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution Value for TU-Games," </span><a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=ja&lr=&id=KT0kbtmW42kC&oi=fnd&pg=PT69&dq=The+Egalitarian+Nonpairwise-Averaged+Contribution&ots=o0FqW72E1g&sig=EuuUxnHYsX7c3mN3aod9DJ4zDUQ" style="color: #888888;"><i>Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp.51-66, </span><b style="font-size: 15.4px;">Kluwer Academic Publishers.</b><span style="font-size: 15.4px;"> 1997.</span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: #fff9ee; color: #222222; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: times;">[6] Y</span><span style="font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; font-size: 15.4px;">.Funaki and T.Driessen, </span><span style="font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; font-size: 15.4px;">"Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games," </span><a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=ja&lr=&id=KT0kbtmW42kC&oi=fnd&pg=PT103&dq=Reduced+Game+Properties+of+Egalitarian+Division+Rules+for+TU-Games&ots=o0FqW72F_d&sig=wpFouxpafL6SJuyOWMVIq7d3oSA" style="color: #888888; font-family: times, "times new roman", serif;"> <i>Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research</i></a><span style="font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; font-size: 15.4px;">, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp.85-103, </span><b style="font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; font-size: 15.4px;">Kluwer Academic Publishers.</b><span style="font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; font-size: 15.4px;"> 1997.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[5] I.</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Dragan, T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"Collinearity between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Division Rules for Cooperative Games," </span><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/l83k5j908p4617t6/2" style="color: #888888;"><i>OR SPEKTRUM</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, Vol.18, No.2, pp 97-105. 1996.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[4] </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions," </span><a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/l83k5j908p4617t6/2" style="color: #888888;"><i>OR SPEKTRUM</i></a><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">, Vol.13, No.1, pp.15-30, 1991.</span></span></div><div style="background-color: #fff9ee; color: #222222; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: 15.4px;"><span style="color: black; font-family: times, times new roman, serif; font-size: medium;">[3] Yukihiko Funaki and Mamoru Kaneko,</span><span style="color: black; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> " <span style="color: #454545;">ECONOMIES WITH LABOR INDIVISIBILITIES</span></span><div class="global-article-inner-title" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #454545; font-family: Meiryo; font-size: medium; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant-east-asian: inherit; font-variant-numeric: inherit; line-height: 22px; margin: 0px 0px 5px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="font-family: times;">PART II: </span><span style="font-size: 14px;"><span style="font-family: times;">COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA UNDER TAX SCHEDULES</span></span><span style="font-family: times;">," <i>Japanese Economic Review</i>, Vol. 37, No.3, pp.199-222, 1986.</span></div><span style="color: black; font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: medium;"></span><div style="color: black; font-family: Meiryo; font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: times, times new roman, serif;">[2] Yukihiko Funaki and Mamoru Kaneko,</span><span style="font-family: times;"> " <span style="color: #454545;">ECONOMIES WITH LABOR INDIVISIBILITIES</span></span><div class="global-article-inner-title" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #454545; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant-east-asian: inherit; font-variant-numeric: inherit; line-height: 22px; margin: 0px 0px 5px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="font-family: times;">PART I: OPTIMAL TAX SCHEDULES," <i>Japanese Economic Review,</i> Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 11-29, 1986.</span></div></div></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";">[1] </span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">Yukihiko Funaki,</span><span style="font-size: 15.4px;">"Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus," </span><i style="font-size: 15.4px;">International Journal of Game Theory</i><span style="font-size: 15.4px;"> Vol.15 No.2, pp.121-129, 1986.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "times";"><br /></span><span style="font-family: "times";"><b>DP, WP, etc.</b></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">・ </span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: times, "times new roman", serif;">Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1502, 2015.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-size: small;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">・ </span></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "times";"> </span><a href="http://dbiref.uvt.nl/iPort?request=full_record&db=wo&language=eng&query=doc_id=327157" style="color: #888888; font-family: times, "times new roman", serif; text-decoration-line: none;">"New Axiomatizations and an Implementation of the Shapley Value," Kongo, T. , Funaki, Y. and Tijs, S.H </a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "times";">,2007. </span></div>
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