English articles
Refereed articles:
[53] René van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Zhengxing Zou, "Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable Contributions," European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 307, Issue 2, Pages 975-983, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
[52] Ai Takeuchi, Robert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo, Yukihiko Funaki, "Bargaining over a Jointly Produced Pie: The Effect of The Production Funation on Bargaining Outcomes," Games and Economic Behaviors, 134, pp169-198, 2022.
[51] Zhengxing Zou, René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki, "Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values," Theory and Decision, 98, 185-217, 2022.
[50] Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, Taro Shinoda, "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation," Games, 12(3), 64, 2021; open access https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064
[49] Zhengxing Zou, René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki,"Compromising between the Proportional and Equal Division Values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 97 , 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102539
[48] Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki,“The unbinding core for coalitional form games,” Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 113, pp. 39-42, September 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007
[47] Takaaki Abe,Yukihiko Funaki, "The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities ," International Journal of Game Theory 50, pp.167-183, 2021 [doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00745-x]
[46] Zhengxing Zou, Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, “Axiomatizations of the proportional division value,” Social Choice and Welfare, 57, pp.35-62, 2021, open access https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01299-3
[45] Adrian Penalver, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama, Yukihiko Funaki and Ryuichiro Ishikawa, "A quantitative easing experiment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 119, October 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103978
[44] Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo and Yukihiko Funaki, "Redistribution to the less productive: Parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," Theory and Decision, 91, pp.81–98, 2021. open access https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09781-1
[43] Peter Borm, Yukihiko Funaki, Yuan Ju, "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," Homo Oeconomicus, Volume 37, pp. 67-85, May 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00097-7
[42] Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki, "The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 50, pp. 167-183, October 2020.doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00745-x
[41] Toru Hokari, Yukihiko Funaki and Peter Sudholter,"Consistency, Anonymity, and the Core on Domain of Convex Games," to appear in Review of Economic Design, 2020.,
[40] Yasushi Asako, Yukihiko Funaki, Kozo Ueda and Nobuyuki Uto, "(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," to appear in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2019.
[39] Yukihiko Funaki, Harold Houba and Evgenia Motchenkova, "Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures," to appear in International Journal of Game Theory, 2019.
[38] Junnosuke Shino, Yukihiko Funaki and Nobuyuki Uto, "Vulnerability of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations to overbidding: An experimental approach," to appear in Global Finance Journal , 2019.
[35] Robert Veszteg and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monetary payoffs and utility in laboratory experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 65, pp. 108-121, April 2018.
[34] Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Robert Veszteg ”Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule," Games, 2017, 8(4), 52; doi:10.3390/g8040052
[33] Yokote Koji, Takumi Kongo and Yukihiko Funaki, "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors," Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 108, pp. 113-124, March 2018.
[32] Yokote Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “Coincidence of the Shapley Value with Other Solutions Satisfying Covariance,” Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 89, pp.1-9, September 2017.
[31] Yokote Koji and Yukihiko Funaki, "Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp.171–203, June 2017.
[30] Yokote Koji, Yasushi Agatsuma and Yukihiko Funaki, "Random Reduction Consistency of the Weber Set, the Core and the Anti-Core," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Volume 85, Issue 3, pp.389–405, June 2017.
[29] Takaaki Abe, and Yukihiko Funaki, “The Non-emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game”, International Journal of Game Theory, 46, pp.715-736, 2017.
[28] Takumi Kongo,Yukihiko Funaki,"Marginal Games and Characterizations of the Shapley Value in TU Games, " Game Theory and Applications, Communications in Computer and Information Science Book Series 758, pp.165-163, Springer, Singapore, 2017.
[27] Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki and Boram Park, “Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-games,” Theory and Decision, Volume 81, Issue 3, pp 427–447,September 2016.
[26] Yokote Koji, Yukihiko Funaki and Yoshio Kamijo, “A New Basis and the Shapley Value,” Mathematical Social Sciences. Vol.80, pp.21-24, 2016.
[25] Takayuki Oishi, Mikio Nakayama, Toru Hokari and Yukihiko Funaki, “Duality and Anti-duality in TU Games Applied to Solutions, Axioms, and Axiomatizations,” Journal of Mathematical Economics.Volume 63, Pages 44–53, March 2016,
[24] Jiang, Ting, Jan Potters and Yukihiko Funaki, “Eye-tracking Social Preferences.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol.29, Issue2-3, pp.157-168, 2016.
[23] Rene van den Brink and Yukihiko Funaki, "Implementation and Axiomatization of Discounted Shapley Values", Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 329-344, 2015.
[22] Robert Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki and Aiji Tanaka: “The impact of the Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami on social capital in Japan: Trust before and after the disaster,” International Political Science Review, published online before, doi: 10.1177/0192512113509501 , April 2, 2014.
[21] Y. Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki, “Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions,” Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 84, pp. 180–195, 2014.
[20] Yukihiko Funaki and Takehiko Yamato "Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes," International Game Theory Review Vol.16, Issue 3, 2014.
[19] Fukuda, E., Y. Kamijo, A. Takeuchi, M. Masui, and Y. Funaki: Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of the keyword auction mechanisms, Rand Journal of Economics vol. 44, Issue3, pp.438-461, 2013.
[18] van den Brink, Rene. Yukihiko Funaki and Gerard van del Laan, "Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties," European Journal of Operational Research 228, pp.413-417, 2013.
[17] Rene van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki and Yuan Ju, "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values" Social Choice and Welfare Volume 40, Issue 3, pp.693-714, 2013.
[16] Grabisch, M. and Y. Funaki, "A Coalition Formation Value for Games in Partition Function Form," European Journal of Operational Research 221, pp.175-185, 2012.
[15] Vyrastekova, J., Y. Funaki and A. Takeuchi, "Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment," Journal of Socio-Economics, 40, pp.919-928, 2011.
[14] Kongo, T., Y. Funaki, R. Branzei and S. Tijs, "Non-cooperative and Axiomatic Characterizations of the Average Lexicographic Value," International Game Theory Review 12, pp.417-435, 2010.
[13] Funaki Y. and R. van den Brink, "Axiomatization of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision 67, pp.303-340, 2009.
[12] Y.Funaki and T.Yamato, "The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core in terms of Consistency," Advances in Dynamic Games Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management, 2006.
[11] H.Aarts, Y.Funaki, C. Hoede."Set games," Power Indices and Coalition Formation, edited by M.J.Holler and G.Owen, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2001.
[10] Y.Funaki and T.Yamato,"The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization," International Game Theory Review 3, pp.175-187, 2001.
[9] Y.Funaki and T.Yamato,"The Core of an Economy with Common Pool Resource: A Partition Function Form Approach," International Journal Game Theory, Vol.28, pp.157-171, 1999.
[8] H.Aarts, Y. Funaki and C.Hoede, "A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.26, pp 97-111 1997.
[7] Y.Funaki and T.Driessen, "The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution Value for TU-Games," Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp.51-66, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.
[6] Y.Funaki and T.Driessen, "Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games," Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp.85-103, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.
[5] I.Dragan, T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, "Collinearity between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Division Rules for Cooperative Games," OR SPEKTRUM, Vol.18, No.2, pp 97-105. 1996.
[4] T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, "Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions," OR SPEKTRUM, Vol.13, No.1, pp.15-30, 1991.
[3] Yukihiko Funaki and Mamoru Kaneko, " ECONOMIES WITH LABOR INDIVISIBILITIES
PART II: COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA UNDER TAX SCHEDULES," Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 37, No.3, pp.199-222, 1986.
[2] Yukihiko Funaki and Mamoru Kaneko, " ECONOMIES WITH LABOR INDIVISIBILITIES
PART I: OPTIMAL TAX SCHEDULES," Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 11-29, 1986.
[1] Yukihiko Funaki,"Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus," International Journal of Game Theory Vol.15 No.2, pp.121-129, 1986.
DP, WP, etc.
・ Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Partition Function Form Game," WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda Institute of Political Economy, No.E1502, 2015.
